When Economic Sanctions Become Weapons of Mass Destruction
Published on: Mar 26, 2004

In imagining Iraq, we might want to start by remembering what Iraq was like thirteen years ago, and how unimaginable its present condition would have been. It would have been unimaginable not just because Iraq's relation to the US has changed so dramatically, but because no one imagined that economic sanctions could look the way they do now.

The economic strangulation of a city or country has long been a part of warfare, either as an appurtenance to warfare or more directly in the form of a siege. But "economic sanctions" suggest something different in both intent and scope. Economic sanctions are generally understood to be driven by political or legal aims, such as punishment, deterrence, or pressure, intended to change the conduct of the target state. They are also distinguished from tariffs or limited retaliatory measures that occur as part of an ongoing trade relation, which are not intended to have broader political significance.

Siege warfare--the military blockade of a city or country to prevent goods from going in, and to prevent people from escaping--raises terribly serious problems from an ethical perspective. The principle of discrimination in Just War doctrine, and in international law, holds that in warfare the belligerents are required to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, and may not target civilians. Yet siege warfare has precisely the opposite effect: when you cut off a city's access to food or water, those who are least able to survive the deprivation are children and infants, the elderly, the sick. At the same time, the state is likely to prioritize security, and shift resources to the military and to the political and military leadership, worsening the situation of civilians. So in siege warfare, the principle of discrimination is effectively inverted: not only is there no special protection for the civilian population, but that is precisely the population that will bear the worst costs, and within the general civilian population, those who suffer first, and worst, are those least responsible for the state's decisions--children and infants, the elderly, the sick.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, economic sanctions bore no resemblance to siege warfare, at least not in practice. They also had a central role in emerging forms of international governance, offering an attractive alternative to the violence of warfare. After World War I, under Article 1 of the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact), the 63 signatory nations agreed to "[c]ondemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy." Article 2 provided that all disputes shall be settled by "pacific means." There was a sense that warfare itself was on the verge of becoming obsolete:

We are living at a turning point in history. This era which has witnessed a world war is also witnessing the beginning of a still greater historical event--a movement to rid the world of war as a political instrument and to make aggressive conflict between civilized nations an international crime.1

Economic sanctions were intended to be the non-violent device by which the League of Nations would prevent aggression and enforce peace and order in the world; the violence of war would be replaced by the peaceful coercion of the boycott.

Economic sanctions of this sort are not "war" in any sense of the term--nor would they lead to war. Such measures could no more be construed by an offending nation as hostile acts than could an individual lawbreaker look upon arrest as a personal insult to himself.2

Economic sanctions were initially justified under international law simply as one of the measures incident to war. Drafts of the Covenant of the League of Nations held that, in the event that one state initiated war, all other states would automatically join the defending state in using all measures generally available in war, whether military or economic.3 However, in the post-World War I diplomatic climate, economic sanctions were re-framed in terms of inconvenience and embarrassment--as an option that presented no ethical difficulties, especially by comparison to war.

The economic weapon, conceived not as an instrument of war but as a means of peaceful pressure, is the great discovery and the most precious possession of the League. Properly organised, it means the substitution of economic pressure for actual war... In so far as they can be applied, this means that for the blowing up of men to pieces with high explosives, the suffocating of civilian populations with poison gas, the dropping of bombs on crowded cities, the blinding, the mutilation, the brutalisation of myriads of men, we should be substituting merely a temporary dislocation and paralysis of trade, a rise in prices, some restriction of comforts and luxuries, the rationing of necessities, the ignominy of being exhibited as a moral outlaw. There is something in this which satisfies the conscience of the world.4

Paradoxically, there was at the same time an insistence that economic sanctions would be an effective response to military aggression, and would accomplish their goals quickly as well. Woodrow Wilson envisioned sanctions in the following terms:

Suppose somebody does not abide by these engagements, then what happens? An absolute isolation, a boycott... No goods can be shipped in or out, no telegraphic messages can be exchanged...there shall be no communication of any kind between the peoples of the other nations and the people of that nation. The nationals, the citizens of the Member States, will never enter their territory until the matter is adjusted, and their citizens cannot leave their territory. It is the most complete boycott ever conceived in a public document, and I want to say with confident prediction that there will be no more fighting after that. There is not a nation that can stand that for six months.5

The belief that war itself might become obsolete evaporated, and the hope that economic sanctions could stop aggression went with it, when the League of Nations' attempt to impose sanctions on Mussolini failed to so much as give him pause in the annexation of Ethiopia. Nevertheless, when the Charter of the United Nations was drafted, economic sanctions were incorporated as an option available to the Security Council. Like the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Charter of the United Nations envisions the use of economic sanctions in response to military aggression--the provisions for economic sanctions are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Article 41 provides that:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions... These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42 provides that where the Security Council finds these measures inadequate, it may use force "to maintain or restore international peace and security." Thus, although Article 41 does not use the language "sanction" or "boycott," it clearly contemplates such measures, but only in the context of a "threat to peace," much the way the Covenant of the League of Nations envisions sanctions for the purpose of deterring military aggression.

In reality, the Cold War meant that the Security Council was largely paralyzed. Since both the US and the USSR were permanent members holding veto power, the Security Council in effect could impose no measures on either of the superpowers, or any of their client states. Economic sanctions were imposed only twice in the first forty years of the UN's existence, on South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Outside the context of international governance, sanctions were often used in the twentieth century by individual nations or coalitions as a means of expressing disapproval, or pressuring the government of a target state to change its policies or conduct. They seem to be an ideal form of political influence: a "middle route" that is more substantial than diplomacy, but less destructive than military measures. At the same time, while there are some costs in lost business, there are no direct costs to the state's budget, so sanctions look quite cheap. They are particularly damaging against countries with a weak economy, or an economy that is highly dependent on imports or exports. As a result, they are particularly attractive to countries with strong and diverse economies, since these countries are effectively immune to retaliation in kind. Consequently it is not surprising that, since World War II, the US has imposed sanctions more frequently than any other nation. "Of 104 sanctions episodes from World War II through the UN embargo of Iraq, the United States was a key player in two-thirds. In 80 percent of US-imposed sanctions, the policy was pursued with no more than minor cooperation from its allies or international organizations."6

Yet they are in fact notoriously ineffectual. The major empirical study of sanctions episodes in the twentieth century is Economic Sanctions Reconsidered7, which looked at over a hundred sanctions episodes since the end of World War I. The authors concluded that in about one-third of the cases, the sanctions had some success in achieving their stated goals. However, a critic of those studies, Robert Pape, argued that many of those cases were overdetermined: the state's conduct did change, but there were other factors besides sanctions, such as military intervention, to which this could have been attributed. If we consider only those cases where there was some success, and where that success could with some certainty be attributed to sanctions, we are left with less than 5% of the cases. Thus, by the most optimistic evaluation, sanctions are likely to be ineffectual in two out of three cases; and those more critical would say that we cannot attribute any effectiveness to sanctions 95% of the time.

It is easy to see why this would be so. Galtung and others have written of the "rally-round-the-flag effect"--that when the population at large is subject to deprivation by a foreign nation, they respond to it as they would a form of attack, with increased nationalism and support of their political leadership.9 Thus, while the intent of the nation imposing the sanctions might be to "send a message" of the wrongfulness of the target state's actions, the effect is to consolidate support for the leadership, and its legitimacy is enhanced rather than undermined. At the same time, the political and military leadership is rarely affected directly by any of the economic deprivation inflicted, since they typically make the fundamental decisions regarding the distribution of the shrinking resources, and can insulate themselves, whether that is justified by security concerns, or simply out of self-interest. In the end, economic sanctions work, if at all, only indirectly: by causing direct suffering to the society, which in turn is intended to create a kind of moral pressure on the leadership. As Walzer describes this phenomenon in siege warfare, what is supposed to influence the leadership is not their own suffering, but "the fearful spectacle of the civilian dead." 10

Prior to 1990, there were no sanctions regimes that could have been characterized in such extreme terms. Just as the Cold War paralyzed the Security Council, it also meant that no imposition of economic sanctions could be comprehensive: if the US imposed sanctions on a nation, it could turn to the Soviet Union bloc for trade; and vice versa. This was crucial in limiting the impact of sanctions. Even though Cuba, for example, has been subject to extensive economic sanctions by the United States for decades, Cuba traded and received subsidies from the eastern bloc, allowing it to maintain one of the highest levels of nutrition, education, professional training, and medical care in Latin America. 11 Thus, in the context of the Cold War, sanctions created inconvenience, and imposed costs and obstacles to economic growth, but were never devastating.

All of this ended when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Russia, which had replaced the Soviet Union on the Security Council, was in no position to challenge the US, and the US obtained Council support for the most comprehensive economic sanctions ever imposed in the name of international governance. Initially even food was not allowed unconditionally; it was to be permitted only in "humanitarian circumstances," and there was considerable dispute over what that meant exactly. 12 Iraq was heavily dependent on oil exports for income; oil revenues made up 60% of the GDP prior to the Gulf War,13 and by 1991 gross domestic product had dropped by about three-quarters of its 1990 value to approximate that of the 1940s.14 Iraq was equally dependent on foreign imports for food and other basic goods; Iraq imported 70% of cereals, legumes, oils, and sugar, prior to 1991.15

The sanctions were continued after the Gulf War, in which massive bombing devastated Iraq's infrastructure and industrial capacity. Most crucial was the destruction of the electrical grid, along with water and sewage treatment facilities, roads, and telecommunications. The UN Secretary-General sent envoys in 1991 to report on the situation. In his report to the Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari maintained that there would be "further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met."16 A few months later, a second envoy confirmed this view, and stated that it would take $16 billion dollars to provide electricity and return food, health care, agriculture, water and sanitation to normal levels.17 Instead, the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 706, which gave Iraq the opportunity to sell $1.6 billion of oil in a six month period, of which part would be used to pay reparations to Kuwait and to fund UN operations. Iraq turned it down on the grounds that the funds were so inadequate to the need, and because Iraq would not have a role in determining the humanitarian and economic priorities. 18 However, it is clear that even if Iraq had accepted the plan, the amount of funding permitted was so little that it could not have even met the need for food and medicine, much less the reconstruction of the infrastructure.

The Security Council committee charged with implementing the sanctions regime, called the "661 Committee" after the Security Council resolution imposing the sanctions, had a dual function: it was charged both with enforcing the sanctions and granting humanitarian exemptions. Unsurprisingly, there was immediately a tension between the humanitarian interests and the security concerns; but there was no guidance in the Council resolutions, or in the UN Charter, for identifying which interest would trump when the two came into conflict. Although food and medicine were allowed through routinely, everything else was subject to an opaque and erratic approval process. There was no precedent for the creation of such a committee, and the committee established no clear procedures for reviewing applications for humanitarian purchases, no criteria for determining what goods should be permitted, no guidelines of any sort. The result was that the committee was tremendously inconsistent: ambulance tires would be permitted on one occasion, then denied three months later. Pencils would be permitted, but only in certain quantities. The committee as a matter of policy refused to provide either the vendor or the Iraqi government with explanations of why contracts for humanitarian goods were rejected, and refused to formulate any criteria that could serve as guidelines.19 As a result, Iraq's ability to buy basic goods was quite limited. In 1994, for example, half the contracts were denied, with no reason given. 20

Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Iraq had deteriorated rapidly. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi government had invested heavily in social and economic development, both before and during the Iran-Iraq war. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had made impressive strides in health, education, and development of the infrastructure. 90% of the population had access to safe water.21 In 1980, the Iraqi government initiated a program to reduce infant and child mortality rates by more than half by 1990. The result was a rapid and steady decline in childhood mortality.22 A 1988 survey in Baghdad conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization noted that undernourishment was no longer a public health problem; in fact, 7% of Iraqi children were obese.23 Female literacy was 85%.24 93% of primary school-age children attended school. 25 93% of the population had access to health care.26 97% of urban residents, and 76% of rural residents, had access to health care.27 The majority of Iraqi physicians were trained in Europe or the United States, and one quarter were board certified.28

Following the Gulf War, there were epidemics of cholera and typhoid, diseases that had been very much under control. In 1990, the incidence of typhoid was 11.3 per 100,000 people; by 1994 it was more than 142 per 100,000. In 1989, there were zero cases of cholera per 100,000 people; by 1994, there were 1344 per 100,000.29 The destruction of the water and sewage treatment facilities during the Gulf War, and Iraq's difficulty obtaining equipment and chemicals for water treatment, meant that the epidemics became permanent.

Once the Oil for Food Programme was put into place in 1996, the process changed considerably. Basic information was made public to vendors and posted on the web. However, the 661 Committee continued to reject contracts for many of the humanitarian goods Iraq sought to purchase, particularly those relating to the infrastructure, and refused to state any criteria or categories of acceptable goods outside of food and medicine, maintaining the confusion and uncertainty. Because the committee operated by consensus, any member could block or delay any contract (except for certain categories of uncontroversial goods such as food, which bypassed the committee), and could do so for any reason, or for no reason. In practice, the only countries that did so were the United States and, very rarely, Britain. In the face of US security concerns, UN agencies put in place increasingly elaborate systems to monitor items such as chlorine, from contracting to delivery to installation to disposal of the empty containers. Despite this monitoring, US holds increased rather than decreased, from $500 million in August 1999 30 to $5.4 billion in July 2002.31 As a result of these policies, and because Iraqi oil sales to generate income were limited at various points in the program, the overall delivery of humanitarian goods to Iraq since 1996 was about $22 billion, as of July 2002.32 That comes to about $180 per person per year, both for individual needs, such as food and water, and for the rehabilitation of the infrastructure. By contrast, this is about one-half the per capita income in Haiti, the poorest country in the western hemisphere. While the population has some access to other goods, this access is very limited, given how little Iraq is able to produce domestically; or very costly, involving purchases on the black market.

The US has generally justified its objections to infrastructure and other humanitarian imports in terms of security concerns. It has often objected to "dual use" goods--goods that have a legitimate civilian use but also could have a military use as well. It is also the case that nearly everything related to the infrastructure of a society, or its industrial capacity, could be considered dual use: electrical generators, water pumps for irrigation, bulldozers for construction, radios and telephones, and so on. Manufacturing facilities that produce pesticides or pharmaceuticals, as well as medical laboratories, computer equipment, and high school science labs, can all theoretically be converted to produce chemical or biological agents. However, prohibiting such facilities does mean that Iraq will be consigned to functioning not much above a pre-industrial level. Such a policy, if it continues, will mean that Iraqi is permanently reduced from a highly modernized, highly educated society with a healthy population and an abundance of food, to a Third World country, with extreme levels of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and preventable diseases.

The US administration has sometimes argued that this is the cost of ensuring security in the region. However, there are grounds for skepticism. The US has blocked, for example, water tankers on the grounds that they are on the "1051 list," a list of goods that raise military concerns. Clearly, in a country where there is massive child mortality attributable to water-borne diseases, water tankers are of considerable urgency. In fact, UNMOVIC, the UN weapons inspectors charged with identifying and tracking goods on the 1051 list, disputed this US claim. Indeed, there have been hundreds of millions of dollars of "1051 disputes"--contracts where the security concern raised by the US was directly disputed by the UN's weapons experts.33

US objections to humanitarian goods have often been criticized for having tenuous justifications, while doing enormous human damage. In winter of 2001, the US blocked $210 million of child vaccines, maintaining that they might be used to produce biological weapons, and that preventing their import into Iraq was so urgent as to justify the extensive number of child deaths. The information was leaked to the press, and the US was openly criticized in the Security Council. Within weeks, the US lifted the holds, raising questions about whether the US itself had believed that the vaccines presented an urgent security threat.34 There has also been skepticism about US claims of security concerns because of the US politicization of its decisions. For example, the US had blocked $60 million of telecommunications contracts with Chinese manufacturers, insisting that the equipment could be used by the Iraqi military and presented security concerns. But in June 2001, when the US badly wanted China's vote on a US proposal concerning Iraq, it lifted the holds immediately, again putting into question the legitimacy of the security claims. 35

In the end, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq demonstrate graphically that sanctions can no longer be viewed as the relatively benign "middle route." It turns out that, in their impact, they can in fact look a great deal like siege warfare. Ironically, in the case of Iraq, they also begin to look much like weapons of mass destruction. We might recall that an estimated 140,000 people were killed directly by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. UNICEF estimated two years ago that the "excess mortality" in Iraq--the number dead who would not have been, if conditions prior to the Gulf War had continued--was 500,000 children under five years of age, more than three times the number of dead in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The US administration, and to some extent UN officials as well, have maintained that the Iraqi government has not been as prompt or cooperative as it should have been, or that to the extent they have had funds outside the Oil for Food Programme at their disposal, they have misused them on military goods or luxuries for Saddam Hussein or the elite. But what is clear is that even if Iraq had the most benevolent and efficient government imaginable, on $180 per person per year, there could not have been anything other than massive impoverishment and suffering; and that is indeed all that Security Council, in particular the United States, has allowed.

The sanctions on Iraq also tell us something about international governance, and the need for accountability. Who would have imagined fifteen years ago that half a million children under five would be dead, under the auspices of a United Nations program? Denis Halliday, the former UN official in charge of humanitarian agencies in Iraq explicitly uses the term "genocide," and he resigned from the UN on the grounds that he could not be complicit in such a practice. If the UN itself is in effect implementing what might reasonably be considered a massive human rights violation, then what can we hope for the future of international governance?

We cannot avoid the problem of US unilateralism and the need for accountability. In this case, the fundamental tension between security concerns and urgent humanitarian needs was not addressed by the broader international community, in a venue such as the General Assemby, nor was the ambiguity in the UN Charter on this issue considered by a venue such as the International Court of Justice. Rather, it was resolved by the US, which determined unilaterally that security concerns, however tenuous and speculative, would override humanitarian concerns, however extensive and certain. In the absence of an effective venue to examine the validity of US claims, the US simply used its power within the 661 Committee to ensure that Iraq would not be permitted to rebuild its infrastructure, even though it is at the cost of what must be considered simply a human catastrophe.

I do not mean to suggest that the Iraqi government had no role in the humanitarian crisis which has gone on now for more than a decade. But we should be clear about what that role is. The US administration has maintained often that if Iraq complied with the disarmament requirement, the sanctions would have been lifted, and the suffering would have ended. However, this claim is problematic, given that the US administrations since the first Bush administration have consistently maintained that they would not agree to lift the sanctions unless there is a change of regime, regardless of whether the Iraqi government complies with the requirements for inspections and disarmament. Yet regime change is not a demand which is contained in any of the Security Council resolutions; nor, arguably, could it have been. The UN Charter, under Chapter VII, authorizes only measures to address aggression, threats to the peace, or breaches of the peace. The Charter itself prohibit the forcible imposition of a "regime change," at least at the hands of individual nations, when it provides in Article 2 that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state..."; and the Security Council resolutions repeatedly reaffirm their commitment to Iraqi sovereignty. Thus, if we take the last three US administrations at their word, there is in fact no relation between Iraq's compliance or noncompliance and the continuing imposition of sanctions; and it would seem that the only thing Iraq could have done to lift the sanctions would have been to comply with a unilateral demand of the US for regime change, unauthorized by any institution of international governance, and, arguably, in direct opposition to the UN Charter.

As the Bush Administration moves forward on its drive toward war, it seems that the economic sanctions regime may soon be entirely irrelevant. As of this writing, the Bush Administration is discussing when, not whether, to go to war, and envisions doing so with or without the explicit authorization of the Security Council; with or without the support of its allies in Europe and the Mideast; and in the face of massive global protests against war. The Bush Administration strategy in this case is described as "shock and awe," the massive use of missiles against densely populated cities in Iraq as a form of psychological intimidation. A recent UN analysis by the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that the human catastrophe will go well beyond psychological intimidation, and in fact will go well beyond the direct destruction done by the bombing. Because there is already such extensive malnutrition, the disruption of the food distribution system would mean that 30% of children under five years of age would be at risk of death; the destruction of electrical generators, which were heavily bombed in 1991, would mean that no more than 40% of the population would have access to potable water; this in turn would likely result in epidemics of water-borne diseases; which would be worsened by shortages of medicines. 36

Precisely these issues--whether regime change can be demanded in a given situation, whether individual nations can justifiably go to war without explicit Security Council authorization, whether particular security claims are well-grounded, and whether security objectives warrant the creation of humanitarian crises--highlight the need for an effective venue of accountability, where a nation seeking to pursue its interests, or seeking to implement its conception of a just world order, must present its information and prove the accuracy of that information; must present its arguments for the interpretation of the law, and have those arguments judged by an independent judiciary. There is considerable wisdom in the rule of law, and all that it entails: that one may not be a judge in one's own case; that the law must be clearly stated, and consistently applied; that there must be an avenue for appeal; that individuals can only be punished for their acts, not their nature or their potential acts. In the end, what the sanctions on Iraq might tell us--as well as the war on Iraq, should it occur--is that the rule of law is fully as urgent in the international arena as it is when an individual is charged with a crime; since the possibility to interpret the law and impose it as one wishes, without restraint, means not that a person is at risk of abuse or injury, but that a whole people might be destroyed, and most perversely, that this might happen in the name of international law.

Selected additional readings:

The most comprehensive and well-documented study of the Iraq sanctions regime: Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999)

Concerning the operation of the 661 Committee: Paul Conlon, United Nations Sanctions Management: A Case Study of the Iraq Sanctions Committee, 1990-1994 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2000)

Diverse theoretical perspectives and case studies on economic sanctions: George A. Lopez, et al., Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) George A. Lopez and David Cortright, in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, ed. George A. Lopez and David Cortright (Boulder: Westview, 1995)

Theoretical overviews of economic sanctions: Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1996) David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985)

Recommended web sites:Campaign Against Sanctions in IraqGlobal Policy ForumOil for Food Programme


1 James Shotwell, "The Committee's Plan and Other Peace Agencies," in Boycotts and Peace: A Report by the Committee on Economic Sanctions, ed. Evans Clark (New York: Harper & Bros., 1932), p. 23.

2 Evans Clark, "The Case for the Committee's Plan," in Boycotts and Peace: A Report by the Committee on Economic Sanctions, ed. Evans Clark (New York: Harper & Bros., 1932), p. 13.

3 The "Phillimore Draft", Art. 2, stated, "If, which may God avert, one of the Allied States should break the Covenant contained in the preceding Article, this State will become ipso facto at war with all the other Allied States, and the latter agree to take and support each other in taking jointly and severally all such measures--military, naval, financial, and economic--as will best avail for the restraining the breach of the Covenant." Another draft, prepared by the British, likewise stated that in these circumstances, the other states of the League were to "regard each other as co-belligerents" and "to take and support each other in taking" "naval, military, or economic measures." Anton Bertram, "The Economic Weapon as a Form of Peaceful Pressure," Proceedings of the Grotius Society, 1931, p. 140-141.

4 Bertram, p. 169.

5 Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations, Hamilton Foley, (Princeton, 1923), cited in Bertram, p. 144.

6 "Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions," Kimberly Ann Elliott, in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, ed. George A. Lopez and David Cortright (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 51.

7 Edited by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, published by the International Institute for Economics. The first edition was published in 1985, the second in 1990, and the third is forthcoming as of this writing.

8 Robert Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work", International Security, vol. 22, no. 2, Fall 1997.

9 Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3, April 1967. See also the discussion by Ivan Eland, "Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy," in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, eds. George A. Lopez and David Cortright (Boulder: Westview, 1995).

10 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2d ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 161.

11 See, for example, "Denial Of Food And Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S Embargo On Health And Nutrition In Cuba," A Report from the American Association for World Health, March 1997.

12 Paul Conlon, United Nations Sanctions Management: A Case Study of the Iraq Sanctions Committee, 1990-1994 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 46.

13 Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) p. 161.

14 "Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq," UNICEF/Iraq, 30 April 1998, p. 8.

15 March 1996, WHO, "Health Conditions of the Population of Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis," p. 8.

16 "Report on humanitarian needs in Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, 10-17 March 1991," S/22366, 20 March 1991, para. 37.

17 "Report to the Secretary-General dated 15 July 1991 on humanitarian needs in Iraq prepared by a mission led by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary- General for humanitarian assistance in Iraq," S/22799, 17 July 1991, para. 26.

18 Abdul-Amir al-Anbari, minutes of Security Council meeting of August 15, 1991, UN Doc. No. S/PV.3004, p. 9.

19 Paul Conlon, who represented the Secretariat on the 661 Committee for the first five years, provides the most detailed description of its operations available in United Nations Sanctions Management: A Case Study of the Iraq Sanctions Committee, 1990-1994 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000).

20 Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 72.

21 March 1996, WHO,"Health Conditions of the Population of Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis," p. 2.

22 "Iraq immunization, diarrhoeal disease, maternal and childhood mortality survey," 1990, UNICEF.

23 Cited in March 1996, WHO, "Health Conditions of the Population of Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis," p. 2.

24 March 1996, WHO, "Health Conditions of the Population of Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis," p. 2.

25 "Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq," UNICEF/Iraq, 30 April 1998, p. 7.

26 March 1996, WHO, "Health Conditions of the Population of Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis," p. 2.

27 Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq," UNICEF/Iraq, 30 April 1998, p. 7.

28 "Unsanctioned Suffering: A Human Rights Assessment of the United Nations Sanctions on Iraq," Center for Economic and Social Rights, May 1996, p. 9

29 March 1996, WHO, "Health Conditions of the Population of Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis," p. 12.

30 "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1242 (1999)," 19 August 1999, S/1999/896, para. 16.

31 "The Humanitarian Programme in Iraq Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 986 (1995)," briefing by Executive Director of the Office of Iraq Programme, 25 September 2002, para. 10.

32 "Weekly Update, 6-12 July, 2002," Office of Iraq Programme.

33 For example, there were $581 million of 1051 disagreements as of September 2001. "Table 3: Holds as at 5 September 2001," Office of Iraq Programme, Contracts Processing and Monitoring Division.

34 Colum Lynch, "Mix of Uses Tangles Sanctions; U.S. Blocks Items to Iraq That Other Nations See as Benign," Washington Post, March 26, 2001, p. A21. "US, France clash over curbs on child vaccines for Iraq," March 8, 2001, Agence France Presse.

35 "Trade Deal Won Chinese Support of U.S. Policy on Iraq," Colum Lynch, Washington Post, July 6, 2001.

36 "Integrated Humanitarian Contingency Plan for Iraq and Neighbouring Countries," confidential draft, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 7, 2003.